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NOTES AND COMMENTS
A NEW ERA FOR SCIENCE AND THE LAW:
THE FACE OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS AFTER
DAUBERT v. MERRELL DOW
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. has clarified the standard of admissibility in fed-
eral court for scientific evidence.' It has also opened the door for a
new relationship between science and the law in the form of expert
testimony. When faced with novel scientific evidence, courts have
principally relied upon two standards of admissibility, the Frye test
and a relevancy approach.2 The Frye test, based on the decision in
Frye v. United States, required that a scientific technique be suffi-
ciently established in a particular field to have gained general accept-
ance.3 Although the Frye standard was followed by a majority of
federal and state courts which considered the issue of novel scientific
evidence, Frye was greatly criticized by commentators.4 After the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, an increasing number of
courts rejected Frye in favor of the more liberal relevancy and helpful-
ness standard based on Rule 702. However, because the issue was not
explicitly addressed in the Federal Rules or the Advisory Committee
Notes, courts have been split over whether Rule 702 incorporated
Frye, leaving it intact, or whether Frye was superseded by the adop-
tion of the rule.5 For many types of well-established scientific evi-
dence the differing standards created no problem. However, for
1. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
2. 1 PAUL C. GIANELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1-5 (2d ed.
1986).
3. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (1923).
4. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2792-93.
5. Id. at 2792-94.
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unconventional scientific evidence, Frye created a cultural lag be-
tween admissibility under a relevancy approach and general accept-
ance by the scientific community.6
In Daubert, the court rejected the conservative Frye test, ruling
that the Federal Rules superseded the common law in this area.7
Looking to the plain language of Rule 702 which deals squarely with
the contested issue, the court found no clear indication that the rule
intended to incorporate a general acceptance standard like that re-
quired for Frye as the absolute prerequisite for admissibility of scien-
tific evidence.8 Furthermore, the rigid general acceptance approach
was found to be incompatible with the liberal thrust of the Federal
Rules.9 However, the court did not merely replace Frye with the un-
limited admission of all relevant scientific evidence. Inherent in the
Rules are limitations which require the trial court to make a prelimi-
nary finding as to the reliability and helpfulness of the proffered scien-
tific evidence.'" The opinion goes further to define the nature and
scope of these limitations."
The guidelines set out in Daubert may alter the use of scientific
evidence even in those circuits which do not currently apply the Frye
test. Furthermore, unlike Frye, the limitations in Daubert apply not
only to "novel" scientific evidence but may also place requirements on
more well-established forms of evidence.'2 This note, in Parts II and
III, will outline the Daubert decision, and examine the state of law
existing prior to Daubert as well as some major criticisms of the Frye
test. Part IV will analyze the court's reasoning and consider the limi-
tations the court places on the admissibility of scientific evidence. Fi-
naUy, Part V will explore the implications which Daubert holds for the
future of scientific evidence in federal courts.
6. 1 GIANELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-5(F).
7. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793-94.
8. Id. at 2794.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 2795-97.
11. Id. at 2795-98.
12. Id at 2796 n.11. The court stated that "[a]lthough the Frye decision itself focused exclu-
sively on 'novel' scientific techniques, we do not read the requirements of Rule 702 to apply
specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence." Id.
[Vol. 29:735
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Facts and History in the Lower Courts
Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller are children born with serious
limb reduction birth defects.13 They alleged that these birth defects
were the result of their mothers' ingestion of the prescription drug
Bendectin during pregnancy.' 4 Bendectin, marketed by Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, was prescribed solely as a treatment for nausea and
vomiting during pregnancy.' 5 After extensive discovery, Merrell Dow
moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs could
not present any admissible evidence that Bendectin causes birth de-
fects in humans.' 6 In support of its motion for summary judgment,
Merrell Dow submitted an affidavit from a well credentialed expert
on birth defect epidemiology stating that he had reviewed all pub-
lished literature on Bendectin and birth defects, and no published
study found the drug capable of being a human teratogen (substance
Which can cause birth defects). 17 On the basis of that review the ex-
pert concluded that Bendectin was not a risk factor for human birth
defects.'
Plaintiffs responded to the motion with testimony of eight other
experts who concluded that Bendectin can cause birth defects.' 9
These conclusions were based on in vitro (test tube) and in vivo (live)
animal studies, analysis of the chemical structure of Bendectin, and
"reanalysis" of previously published epidemiological studies.20 The
District Court granted summary judgment for Merrell Dow stating
13. Id. at 2791; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir. 1991),
aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
14. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
15. Id.; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
16. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
17. Id. Dr. Steven H. Lamm, Merrell Dow's expert, is a physician and epidemiologist with
graduate degrees in medicine from the University of Southern California. He has published
numerous articles on epidemiology and has been a consultant to the National Center for Health
Statistics. Id. at 2791 n.1.
18. Id. at 2791.
19. Id. Plaintiffs' experts consisted of Dr. Adrian Gross, Dr. Stuart Newman, Dr. Alan K.
Done, Dr. Shanna Swan, Dr. Jay Glasser, Dr. Wayne Snodgrass, Dr. Johannes Thiersch and Dr.
John Palmer. All were well credentialed. For example, Dr. Stuart Newman has graduate de-
grees in chemistry from Columbia University and the University of Chicago. He is a professor at
New York Medical College and has studied the effects of chemicals on limb development for
over a decade. Their testimony was submitted in the form of affidavits, deposition transcripts,
and transcripts from previous trials. Most had testified in other Bendectin cases. All would
testify that it was their opinion that Bendectin was capable of causing human birth defects.
Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 573-74.
20. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
1994]
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that epidemiological studies are the most reliable evidence of causa-
tion and that expert opinion not based on this type of study is inadmis-
sible.21 The court also found that the study based on recalculation was
unpublished, not subjected to peer review, and did not sufficiently in-
dicate an association between Bendectin and birth defects to create a
genuine issue for a jury.22
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, reviewing the issue de novo,
affirmed the judgment. 3 The appellate court relied on the Frye stan-
dard, requiring scientific evidence to be generally accepted as reliable
by the scientific community.24 Additionally, the court was persuaded
by Bendectin cases from other circuits which had also refused similar
scientific evidence.25 Based on this information, the court summarily
dismissed the in vitro and in vivo studies, and the chemical analysis
because they required verification by further epidemiological stud-
ies.26 The reanalysis of previously published epidemiological data,
while a generally accepted scientific technique, was also rejected be-
cause the study relied on was neither published nor peer reviewed and
was prepared solely for use in litigation.2 7
B. The Issue
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to clarify the
proper standard in federal courts for the admission of scientific evi-
dence.28 The majority of federal courts, including the Ninth Circuit,
relied upon the general acceptance standard formulated in Frye v.
United States.29 This standard requires that novel scientific evidence
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in a par-
ticular field.30 Other circuits, however, had ruled that Frye was super-
seded by the Federal Rules of Evidence, in particular Rule 702, which
merely requires that scientific evidence assist the trier of fact, a help-
fulness standard.31 Because Frye is more conservative in its approach
21. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575-76.
22. Id
23. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1991).
24. Id. at 1130.
25. Id. at 1129-31.
26. Id.
27. Id at 1130-31.
28. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2792.
29. Id. at 2792-93.
30. Id.
31. 1 GIANELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-6.
[Vol. 29:735
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in admitting scientific evidence, this division in the courts could affect
the substantive rights of litigants in conflicting circuits.32
III. THE LAW PRIOR To D.4uBERT
A. The Frye Test - General Acceptance in the Scientific
Community
Since its formulation, the Frye test for admissibility of novel sci-
entific evidence has been the dominant standard in courts which have
considered the issue.33 Originated in Frye v. United States, a short,
citation-free opinion concerning the admissibility of the evidence ob-
tained from a systolic blood pressure test, Frye requires the proponent
of evidence from a novel scientific technique to establish that the tech-
nique has gained general acceptance in the scientific community.34 In
now famous words the court wrote:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field which it belongs.35
The Frye test has been applied to many forensic techniques, in-
cluding polygraph tests, DNA profiling, various intoxication tests, bite
mark comparisons, and blood analysis.36 In addition, other types of
expert testimony which rely on a scientific background, such as testi-
mony on rape trauma syndrome,37 child sexual abuse,38 and dating of
32. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794 n.6. Because the court held that the Frye test was super-
seded by the Federal Rules, it did not need to address the issue of whether, in a diversity case,
application of Frye affected the parties' substantive rights in violation of Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Id.
33. Id. at 2792.
34. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
35. Id. This oftquoted passage is sometimes referred to as infamous. "Shepard's Federal
Citations lists over one thousand citations to Frye in state and federal courts." Edward R.
Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years - The Effect of
"Plain Meaning" Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence,
and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 857, 877 (1992).
36. 1 GIANELLI & IMwINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-5.
37. Id. § 1-5, at 11 & n.68.
38. See generally Linda E. Carter, Admissibility of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse
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photographs based on astronomical data39 have also been held to a
general acceptance standard.
There are a variety of justifications for a general acceptance test
for novel scientific evidence. Principal among them is that application
of the test tends to insure reliability of scientific evidence.40 The test
guarantees protection against the possible prejudicial effects of the ad-
mission of specious or unreliable scientific evidence.4' Frye permits
scientists within a field, who have the greatest knowledge of a tech-
nique, to study it and approve its scientific status.42 A general accept-
ance test also reportedly guarantees that there will be a group of
experts in a particular technique to critically examine its reliability
and application in a certain case.43 Proponents of Frye also argue that
it promotes uniformity of decision. 44 Fears that scientific testimony
will assume a position of mythic infallibility or special reliability and
trustworthiness with a jury or that trials will turn into battles of the
experts have been cited in decisions to apply Frye.45 But perhaps the
basic underlying reason Frye has persisted is its flexibility and ease in
application.46
Most courts find that the application of the general acceptance or
Frye test requires a two-step analysis.47 The first step involves identi-
fication of the appropriate field.48 The second step is determining
whether the scientific principle has been generally accepted within
that field.49 Some courts also require a third step evaluating whether
the testing laboratory followed the generally accepted procedures.50
This last has been called Frye Plus."'
39. United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 757 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding testimony of
astronomer in perjury trial that photo could not have been taken on a certain date must be
generally accepted by scientific community).
40. 1 GiANELu & IMwrNKELMRED, supra note 2, § 1-5(A).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1985).
42. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
43. Id. at 744.
44. 1 GIANELU & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-5(A).
45. Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 371-72 (Md. 1978).
46. See generally 1 GIANELLt & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-5(B)(1)-(3).
47. Id. § 1-5(B).
48. Id. § 1-5(B)(1).
49. Id. § 1-5(B)(2)-(3).
50. United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th
Cir. 1991) (vacating after death of defendant); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1989).
51. 1 GIANELLI & IMWINKELRMED, supra note 2, § 1-5(G).
[Vol. 29:735
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As many forensic techniques do not fall within a single field of
scientific knowledge, selecting the proper field may influence the out-
come of the general acceptance test." One court concluded that the
appropriate field from which general acceptance should be deter-
mined is those who would be reasonably expected to be familiar with
the test's use. 3 However, judicial selection of a particular field or
sub-field has been criticized as a way of manipulating the outcome of
the Frye test, or at the very least, undermining its essential rationale. 4
Once the court determines the appropriate field, it must assess
whether the technique is generally accepted. What percentage of
acceptance constitutes "generally accepted" has never been clearly
delineated. 6 It is clear that the acceptance of one or even several
experts is insufficient to establish general acceptance.5 7 The Califor-
nia Supreme Court has given the clearest indication of the degree of
acceptance required.58 That court required that a technique be sup-
ported by a clear majority of the scientific community.5 9 Standards
such as "widespread, prevalent and extensive, 60 or a "substantial seg-
ment of the scientific community"' 61 have been used. Other questions
such as whether a proponent of evidence must establish the general
acceptance of both the scientific technique and the underlying theory,
or how many and what type of experts are required to show general
acceptance also remain unanswered.62
The merits and criticisms of the Frye test have been debated in
the courts and by commentators. 63 Basic debates have centered
around two concerns; vagueness in the application of the test, and
Frye's essentially conservative character6a4 Because Frye applies only
to novel scientific evidence, courts may apply it selectively.65 Further-
more, as noted previously, uncertainties about determining the appro-
priate scientific field and the level of acceptance required create
52. Id. at 14. See also United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978).
53. People v. Williams, 331 P.2d 251 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1958).
54. Becker & Orenstein, supra note 35, at 878.
55. 1 GiAwNU.i & IMwINKELAMRD, supra note 2, § 1-5(B)(2)-(3).
56. Id. § 1-5(B)(2).
57. Id. § 1-5.
58. Id. § 1-5(B)(3).
59. People v. Guerra, 690 P.2d 635, 656 (Cal. 1984).
60. United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685, 688 (D.D.C. 1972).
61. Reed y. State, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (Md. 1978).
62. 1 GIANELLi & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-5(B)(3).
63. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793 (1993).
64. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3rd Cir. 1985).
65. Becker & Orenstein, supra note 35, at 878.
1994]
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difficulties, in implementing the test uniformly.66 Because Frye re-
quires a court to wait until a valid scientific technique becomes gener-
ally accepted, it creates a cultural lag which may exclude otherwise
reliable and probative evidence from consideration by the jury.67 This
process impedes the essential truth-seeking function of litigation.68 Fi-
nally, the general acceptance test relies heavily on precedent without
subsequent review of the validity of a scientific technique once it is no
longer deemed novel.69 A test for scientific evidence which unques-
tionably accepts an outdated technique while closely scrutinizing new
or current technology is at odds with the basic nature of science which
always searches for new, temporary theories to explain phenomena.70
B. Relevancy, Helpfulness, and the Federal Rules of Evidence
With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence it was un-
clear whether Frye was superseded by the standards set forth in the
rules, or incorporated into them.7 ' The issue was not addressed in the
rules themselves, the Advisory Committee Notes, or in the legislative
history.72 Therefore, a number of courts continued to apply the Frye
test, while others rejected it in favor of a standard based on Rules 401,
402, 403, and 702.73 These rules provide the framework for an admis-
sibility standard based on the relevance and helpfulness of the
evidence.
66. Id. See also Downing, 753 F.2d at 1236; United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198
(2d Cir. 1978) (noting impact on admissibility of applying Frye test).
67. 1 GIANELLi & IMWINKELMED, supra note 2, § 1-5(E).
68. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1236.
69. See Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1130-31 (relying on other Bendectin cases in determining ad-
missibility of evidence). Compare Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C.
Cir. 1988)(finding chemical analysis, in vitro, and in vivo evidence insufficient to show causa-
tion); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046
(1990)(holding reanalysis of prior epidemiological study insufficient to support jury verdict);
Lynch v. Merrell-National Lab., 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987)(relying on agent orange litigation
to find reanalysis evidence insufficient) with Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 506 A.2d
1100 (D.C. App. 1986), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990)(holding that chemical analysis, in vivo,
in vitro, and reanalysis evidence was sufficient to support jury verdict).
70. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993).
71. For a catalogue of federal courts recognizing Frye, see 1 GIANELLI & IMWINKELTRED,
supra note 2, § 1-5, at 9 n.54. For a catalogue of state court cases, see id. § 1-5, at 9-10 n.55.
72. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2794. See also Becker & Orenstein, supra note 35, at 877.
73. 1 GIANELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-5(F), at 23. Compare United States v.




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 29 [1993], Iss. 3, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol29/iss3/7
A NEW ERA FOR SCIENCE AND THE LAW
Generally, all evidence, to be admissible, must be relevant.74 The
Rule states that "[e]vidence which is not relevant is inadmissible." 75
Rule 401 defines relevancy as having "any tendency" to make the
existence of a material fact more or less probable.76 Expert testimony
is further limited by Rule 702 which requires that scientific knowledge
must assist the trier of fact understand the evidence or determine a
fact in issue, a helpfulness standard. 7 Finally, all admissible evidence
is subject to exclusion under Rule 403 if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, mis-
leading the jury, or wasting time.78
Under these rules, the key to the relevance of scientific evidence
is its reliability.79 Unreliable evidence has no probative value and is
therefore irrelevant and inadmissible. 80 Most trial judges do not pos-
sess the scientific background necessary to determine the reliability of
a scientific technique, and therefore must depend on the testimony of
experts to determine a technique's probative value.81 Unlike Frye,
under the relevancy approach the testimony of one expert may be suf-
ficient to establish reliability.82 The level of acceptance of a technique
in the scientific community is a factor to which the court may look to
determine the relevance, but it is not necessarily determinative.83
Other factors can include the qualifications and stature of the expert,
novelty of the theory or process, its rate of error, and the existence of
specialized literature. 4 Courts which apply this approach generally
envision a flexible set of criteria in determining reliability rather than
the strict approach in Frye.85
74. Rule 402 states: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority." FED. R. EVID. 402.
75. Id.
76. FED. R. EvID. 401.
77. The Rule provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in form of an
opinion or otherwise." FED. R. Evr. 702.
78. Rule 403 allows: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumula-
tive evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.




83. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985).
84. Id. at 1238-39.
85. Id. at 1238.
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Once a court has determined that scientific evidence is suffi-
ciently reliable, it must then weigh the probative value against any
danger that the evidence will confuse or mislead the jury, be a waste
of time, or present an unfair prejudice.8 6 It may seem counterintuitive
to suggest that otherwise reliable evidence should be excluded on the
premise that it could confuse a jury, but some scientific evidence may
have assumed, in the mind of the lay jury, a position of infallibility.8 7
Other instances where a jury is not presented with the data upon
which the experts base their opinions also have the potential to con-
fuse or mislead. 8 In these cases, the jury must either accept the ex-
pert's conclusions or totally disregard them, while being unable to
assess the weight of the evidence. If these dangers substantially out-
weigh the probative value of the evidence it should be excluded.89
Another problem which must be addressed under Rule 403 is duplica-
tive evidence which would substantially waste the court's time. Over-
stated opinions from experts or statistical conclusions given in
astronomical numbers which could lead to unfair prejudice can also be
excluded.90 In both of these instances, the court may exclude a por-
tion of the evidence while admitting the rest, or fashion an instruction
which alerts the jury to potential dangers of misuse.91
The Third Circuit, in United States v. Downing, added an addi-
tional requirement prior to admission of scientific evidence, essen-
tially one of "fit."9 The proffered scientific evidence must be
sufficiently tied to the facts of the case to aid the jury in resolving the
dispute.93 If the expert testimony does not relate sufficiently to the
facts of the case it is not relevant or helpful.94 This is actually just an
extension of the relevance requirement already applicable in Rule
402.
86. 1 GIANELLI & IMwINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-6(B); Downing, 753 F.2d at 1239.
87. Downing, 753 F.2d at 1239. See also United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741,744 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
88. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1239 (3rd Cir. 1985).
89. Id.
90. See United States v. Wo Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir. 1990), reh'g vacated and appeal
dismissed, 925 F.2d 1127 (1991) (8th Cir. 1991) (vacating after death of defendant).
91. Expert testimony on a DNA profile may be admissible provided it meets the standard,
but statistics which indicate the probability of a match may nevertheless be excluded altogether
or modified to a much lower figure or phrase such as "very highly probable" where prejudicial
effect substantially outweighs probative force. See Two Bulls, 918 F.2d at 61-2.
92. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242-43 (3rd Cir. 1985).
93. Id. at 1242.
94. See id at 1243.
[Vol. 29:735
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Evidence can be reliable and helpful under this standard without
having gained the general acceptance of the scientific community.95
In some cases, a technique's lack of general acceptance will prove de-
terminative of its unreliability, but even techniques which are not gen-
erally accepted may be, nevertheless, valid.96 Conversely, a technique
which is generally accepted may be unreliable.97 Therefore, the stan-
dard set forth in the Federal Rules is inconsistent with Frye.98 It is in
light of these sharp divisions between the courts that the Supreme
Court reviewed Daubert.99
IV. THE DA uBERT DECISION
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Court re-
jected arguments that the Federal Rules of Evidence incorporated the
Frye test, leaving common law intact."° Instead, it found that Frye's
austere standard was inconsistent with the policy of liberal admissibil-
ity of expert testimony in the Federal Rules.1' 1 Additionally, because
the rules themselves provided no specific limits on the admissibility of
scientific evidence, the Court attempted to define the nature and
scope of that admissibility.' 0 2
A. Frye was Displaced by the Federal Rules of Evidence
As noted above, neither the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Advi-
sory Committee Notes, nor their legislative history addressed the issue
of whether the Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the
Rules.'0 3 Interpreting the legislatively enacted Rules as it would any
other statute, the Court first looked to the language of the rules them-
selves.'0 4 The liberal admissibility policy set forth in Rule 402 supplies
the foundation for all other rules.'0 Under this rule, all relevant evi-
dence is admissible unless otherwise provided.
0 6
95. 1 Gi AIELu & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-5(F).
96. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985).
97. Id. at 1236-37 n.14.
98. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993).
99. Id. at 2792.
100. Id. at 2793-94.
101. Id. at 2794.
102. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794-96 (1993).
103. Id at 2794.
104. Id. at 2793-94.
105. Id.
106. FED. R. EVID. 402.
1994]
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The Frye decision predated the Federal Rules by half a cen-
tury."°7 Therefore, the Court considered the issue of whether the
background of common law continues the exist under the Rules. Re-
lying on its earlier decision in United States v. Abel, the Court stated
that "the Rules occupy the field."'1 8 In theory, no common law exists
under the Federal Rules.'0 9 However, in reality common law precepts
continue to exist under the Rules but in a different form. 10 Where
the common law is consistent with the policies of the Rules, it contin-
ues to exist as guidance in their exercise."'
In Abel, the Supreme Court found that the common law availabil-
ity to cross examine witnesses for bias was entirely consistent with the
liberal admissibility policy of the Rules." 2 Additionally, before the
Rules were promulgated unanimity existed on the issue in the
courts. 1 3 Therefore, the Supreme Court reasoned that it was unlikely
that the drafters of the Rules intended to entirely scuttle existing com-
mon law in this area." 4 Consequently, in this case the common law
survived their adoption." 5 Conversely, in Bouraily, the Court found
that the existing common law "bootstrapping rule," requiring in-
dependent evidence of a conspiracy prior to admission of the hearsay
statements of a co-conspirator, .was inconsistent with the clear inten-
tion of the Rule, and therefore, the common law requirement was su-
perseded and the Rule alone prevailed."16
In the case of scientific evidence Rule 702 deals specifically with
the issue of expert testimony. 1 7 The Rule merely provides that if sci-
entific knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evi-
dence or determining a fact in issue, an expert may testify thereto.118
Nowhere is there a requirement that the evidence be generally ac-
cepted by the scientific community before it is admissible. 1 9 Further-
more, the Court found that the "rigid general acceptance requirement
of Frye" is at odds with the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules.120 The





112. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 51 (1984).
113. Id. at 50.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 178-79 (1987).
117. FED. R. EvID. 702.
118. Id.
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Rules offer a relaxed approach to the traditional barriers to the admis-
sion of expert testimony.'21 It is against this permissive backdrop of
admissibility and the specific language of Rule 702 that the Court
found that Frye was inconsistent with the Rules and should not be
applied in federal courts.'
B. Guidelines for Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
1. Definitional Limitations
The Court found that the language of Rule 702 clearly contem-
plated limits on the subjects and theories to which an expert may tes-
tify' 23 The subject of the expert's testimony must be "scientific...
knowledge."' 24 "[S]cientific" refers to a "grounding in the methods
and procedures of science."'" It represents a process of proposing
and testing hypotheses subject to further testing and refinement.2 6
"[K]nowledge" applies to "any body of known facts or any body of
ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good
grounds."'2 7 Subjective belief or unsupported speculation does not
constitute knowledge within the meaning of the Rule."2 However,
the Court does not require that the subject of scientific testimony be
known to a certainty. 2 9 Such a requirement would be unreasonable
because there are arguably no such certainties in science. 30 Scientists
do not assert that they know what is truth.'3 ' Rather, the process of
science revolves around continually changing hypotheses with the




123. Id. at 2795.
124. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993). "Rule 702 also
applies to 'technical, or other specialized knowledge.' Our discussion is limited to the scientific
context because that is the nature of the expertise offered here." Id. at 2795 n.8.




129. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993).
130. Id.
131. Id. "Indeed, scientists do not assert that they know what is immutably 'true' - they are
committed to searching for new, temporary theories to explain, as best they can, phenomena."
Id.
132. Id. "Science is not an encyclopedic body of knowledge about the universe. Instead, it
represents a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world that are
subject to further testing and refinement." Id. (emphasis in original).
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Therefore, any proffered evidence must be derived from scientific
methods. 33 It must also be supported by appropriate validation. 34
The requirement that the experts proffered testimony relate to "scien-
tific knowledge" creates the standard of evidentiary reliability within
the Rule. 35
2. Helpfulness
Additionally, Rule 702 requires that evidence or testimony "assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue.' 36 This requirement reflects that scientic evidence must be
helpful to be admissible. 37 Expert testimony which is not probative
of an issue is not relevant, and therefore inadmissible.'38 This rele-
vance prerequisite is comparable to the requirement of "fit" in Down-
ing. 39 Scientific evidence which is admissible for one purpose may
not be admissible for another. 40 As an example the Court referred to
the study of the phases of the moon. This type of evidence may be
admissible where an issue was one of whether a particular night was
dark. However, evidence of phases of the moon would be inadmissi-
ble, absent a credible link, to show that an individual behaved irra-
tionally on a certain night.14' The court stated the Rule 702 "requires
a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition
to admissibility."'142
C. The Role of the Trial Judge Under Rule 702
Before admitting scientific evidence, the Court stated that the
trial judge must make a preliminary determination under Rule 104(a)
that evidence meets the standard set forth. 43 Unlike Frye or earlier
133. Id.
134. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993).
135. Id. Evidentiary reliability referred to in Daubert can be distinguished from "validity" or
"reliability" as used in the sciences. Generally validity means the extent to which the "principle
support[s] what it purports to show." Scientific reliability requires that the application of the
principle produces consistent results. The court uses reliability to mean evidentiary reliability,
which it deems to be based on scientific validity. Id. at 2795 n.9. See also 1 GIANELLI & IM-
wINKEL tED, supra note 2, § 1-1, at 1 n.1.
136. FED. R. EVID. 702.
137. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
138. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
139. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242-43 (3d Cir. 1985).
140. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
141. ld.
142. Id.
143. Id. "Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness,...
or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court ...." FED. R. EyWD. 104(a).
[Vol. 29:735
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versions of the relevancy test, the Supreme Court does not read Rule
702 as applicable only to novel scientific evidence. 44 Therefore, even
well established techniques are subject to challenge and review under
the ruling in Daubert.1' An exception exists where the theory is so
well established that it has attained the status of "scientific law."'1 46
Theories such as the laws of thermodynamics are the proper subjects
of judicial notice under Rule 201.1 7
The inquiry of the trial court is flexible, focusing on the scientific
validity of the theory or technique which will yield the evidentiary
relevance and reliability requisite in the Rule.14 Judges are admon-
ished to focus only on the principles and methodology used, not the
conclusions generated. 49 Expert opinion based on scientific evidence
can be sound even if in disagreement with the testimony of another
expert or the judge's own opinion. 50 As guidance the Court offered
several factors which trial judges may consider in determining the reli-
ability of the evidence proffered.' 51 These factors, rather than repre-
senting a definitive list of considerations, were intended as general
observations on the type of appropriate inquiries."'
1. Testability
Scientific methodology is based on generating and testing hypoth-
eses to see if they can be falsified. 53 The process consists of propos-
ing and refining theoretical explanations subject to further testing and
refinement.' 5  Science does not rely on faith or opinion. It is this
methodology that distinguishes science from other forms of inquiry. 55
Therefore, a key question to be answered in determining whether evi-
dence constitutes "scientific knowledge" is whether the theory or pro-
cess can be or has been tested.' 56
144. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796 n.11 (1993).
145. Id.
146. IL
147. Id. The Rule allows judicial notice of facts which are "capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." FED. R.
EvID. 201(b).
148. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993).
149. Id
150. Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It Should Not Be
Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 641 (1991).
151. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795-97 & 2795 n.7.
152. 1I at 2796.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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2. Peer Review and Publication
Publication is one element of peer review, an important part of
the scientific process. 157 Submission to the scientific community for
review is a component of good science.15 This critical scientific scru-
tiny increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in the research will
be detected. 5 9 However, propositions which are relatively recent or
of limited and specialized interest may not be published. This lack of
publication does not necessarily indicate unreliability of the theory or
methods. 6 Therefore, while publication in a peer reviewed journal is
relevant to the evidentiary reliability, it is not determinative of
admissibility. 6'
3. Error Rate
The rate of error of a scientific technique may also be an impor-
tant factor in determining its reliability. 162 Whether the error rate is
known, the type of error possible, and the existence of standards
which control the technique's operation may have bearing not only on
the admissibility of the evidence but also its weight at trial.1 63 A tech-
nique which has a large error rate may be so unreliable as to be inad-
missible.'64 Similarly, the lack of controls which guarantee that the
technique was properly administered can also affect reliability. 6
Therefore, the judge should consider a technique's known or potential
error rate prior to admission.' 66
4. General Acceptance by the Scientific Community
Although the Frye test for general acceptance by the scientific
community was superseded by the Federal Rules as the sole criteria
for determining admissibility of scientific evidence, it may continue to
be an appropriate factor in determining reliability. 67 Inquiry into a
technique's degree of acceptance within its relevant scientific commu-
nity is no longer explicitly required to establish admissibility, but it is
157. Id. at 2797.
158. Id.
159. Id.




164. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1239 (3d Cir. 1985).
165. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978).
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permitted.'6" The degree of acceptance can be an important element
of reliability. A known technique which does not have substantial
support may in fact be unreliable and should properly be viewed with
skepticism. 69
D. Limitations Present in Other Rules of Evidence
Outside of the factors necessary to satisfy Rule 702 prior to ad-
missibility, other evidentiary rules further safeguard the integrity of
scientific evidence. The Court recommends that a judge keep these in
mind when assessing the admissibility of scientific evidence.170 Rule
703 allows experts to base their testimony and opinions on evidence
which may otherwise be inadmissible.17' However, the rule requires
that those facts and data must be of the type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the field. 72 If the court is presented with conflicting or
confusing testimony as to either the reliability of the proffered evi-
dence or for any other reason, Rule 706 allows the court to appoint an
expert of its own.173 The Advisory Committee Notes to this rule state
that the court's inherent power to appoint an expert of its own choos-
ing is virtually unquestioned.7 The possibility that the court may ap-
point its own expert may also have a sobering effect on the parties and
their experts, making court appointment itself often unnecessary. 75
Perhaps the most significant limitation on the admissibility of sci-
entific evidence, apart from Rule 702, is the considerations in Rule
403. This rule, applicable to all types of evidence, allows the court to
exclude relevant evidence on the basis of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, misleading the jury, or waste of time. 76 If the probative
value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by these dangers, the
court may exclude otherwise admissible evidence.177
Expert testimony is not limited in scope to personal knowledge
like that of lay witnesses. 7 s The Rules allow experts to testify in the
168. Id.
169. let
170. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797-98.
171. FED. R. EVID. 703.
172. Id.
173. FED. R. EVID. 706.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. FED. R. EviD. 403.
177. Id.
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form of opinion or on the ultimate issue of fact.179 Therefore, testi-
mony by experts can have a greater ability to mislead or prejudice a
jury and requires a higher level of scrutiny than that to which lay wit-
nesses are subject. 80 In Daubert the Court cited Judge Weinstein in
stating that "[b]ecause of this risk, the judge.., exercises more con-
trol over experts than over lay witnesses.""8 Consequently, Rule 403
represents an important safeguard to prevent the admission of inap-
propriate scientific evidence.
E. Other Safeguards
Twenty-two amicus briefs were filed in connection with
Daubert.18 Some expressed concerns about the impact the decision
would have on the future of the relationship between science and the
law. The Court found that the apprehension that abandonment of the
general acceptance standard will result in an evidentiary "free-for-all"
is overly pessimistic and better resolved by the traditional mechanisms
of the adversarial system than with exclusionary rules.' 83 "Vigorous
cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful in-
struction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."'" The Court ad-
vised trial judges to make use of the mechanisms of directed verdict
and summary judgment to deal with evidence insufficient to support a
jury verdict.'85 The use of these conventional devices, rather than
wholesale exclusion of evidence is more consistent with the tran-
scending policy of the Federal Rules which supports liberal
admissibility. 18 6
In addition, the Court also addressed fears that the gate-keeping
responsibility accorded the trial judge under this decision will stifle
the search for the truth.'8 While both scientific and legal inquiries
require open debate, the search for truth in the courtroom is different
179. "[T]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objec-
tionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." FED. R. EViD.
704.
180. Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993); Weinstein, supra
note 150, at 632.
181. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
182. Id. at 2799 (J. Rehnquist concurring in part, dissenting in part).
183. Id. at 2798.
184. Id.
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from that in the laboratory. s8 In science, theories are continually re-
vised and altered.'8 9 Scientists suggest wide-ranging hypotheses with
the knowledge that incorrect ones will be so identified. 90 This pro-
cess of hypothesis, testing, and conformation, modification, or refuta-
tion is essential to science.' 9' However, legal judgment is binding, at
least with respect to an instant case, and is not subject to later revi-
sion.19 Courts must search for a quick and final truth. The Court
recognized that any gate-keeping role, no matter how flexible, is likely
to result in some valid insights and innovations being excluded. 93
However, the Court found that the possibility of exclusion was part of
the balance which must be struck between the disciplines of science
and the law.' 94
F. The Dissent
Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred with the part of the opinion
which concluded that the Frye test did not survive the enactment of
the Federal Rules of Evidence.95 However, joined by Justice Stevens,
he dissented from the portion of the opinion which offered guidelines
to the lower courts on the implementation of Rule 702 in the absence
of Frye.196 These observations were not applied to deciding the case
at hand and were therefore "not only general, but vague and ab-
stract.' '1 97 Chief Justice Rehnquist warned that dicta of the Supreme
Court carries great weight in the lower courts and the unusual subject
matter of this case warrants great caution in determining more than is
necessary to decide the case. 9 In addition to the general disagree-
ment over the prudence of offering guidelines to aid the lower courts,
the dissent opposed some of the observations themselves.' 99 Specifi-
cally, there was no mention in the rule of a requirement of reliability
of scientific evidence which had been relied upon by the Court.2°
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993).
191. See id. at 2796.
192. Id. at 2798.
193. Id.
194. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2799 (1993).
195. Id.
196. Id. (Rehnquist, CJ. dissenting).
197. Id.
198. Id.
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The dissent was also concerned that the guidelines given by the
Court as an aid in interpretation of its decision will simply raise more
questions.20 1 Definitional questions such as what constitutes "scien-
tic... knowledge," "appropriate validation," "evidentiary reliabil-
ity," or "scientific validity" will all present problems for the lower
courts when assessing admissibility.202 Finally, the dissent raised other
questions about the interpretation of Rule 702. Do the guidelines for
admissibility of scientific knowledge also apply to technical or other
specialized knowledge mentioned in the Rule? 20 3 What is the differ-
ence between scientific and technical knowledge? 204 Did the authors
of the Rule intend it to be broken down into subspecies of expert
opinion, each with its own admissibility criteria?2 5 These questions
remain unanswered. The dissent believed that Rule 702 clearly gives
judges some gate-keeping responsibilities when faced with scientific
evidence but would have declined to offer overall limitations such as
those contained in the opinion itself.20 6
V. TH FuTuRE OF ScIENTIFIc EVIDENCE AFTER DA uBERT
The Daubert decision has the potential to open up a new view of
the role of scientific evidence in the courts, allowing the use of experts
in the courtroom to more closely mirror the scientific debate which
takes place in the laboratory. This shift could result in a greater abil-
ity for truth-seeking in the adversarial process. On the other hand,
there are dangers inherent in this expansion of the admissibility with-
out corresponding safeguards. The opinion in Daubert offers judges
the means to prevent a free-for-all, but if trial courts do not carefully
exercise their gate-keeping role to exclude overwhelming, unreliable,
or repetitive evidence, trials could degenerate to a litany of expert
testimony which, rather than assisting the jury to determine a material
fact, merely confuses or overwhelms them. As a result of the decision
to supersede the Frye test, support for proposed reform amendment




203. Id. But see id. at 2795 n.8.
204. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2800 (1993) (Rehnquist, CJ.
dissenting).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2795 n.7 & 2800.
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The role of science in the courts can only be benefitted by more
open debate about the validity and reliability of the expert testimony
offered. Scientific "truth" is in actuality a set of hypotheses which are
continually being revised.2"7 There may be theories which are so well
accepted that they have attained the status of scientific law, but the
majority of science is in a continual state of flux. Research done to-
morrow may invalidate the "truth" accepted today. With Daubert, the
legal system has attempted to integrate this view of the scientific pro-
cess into its own use of experts. 0 While it is true that the law and
science have different truth-seeking goals, the limitations in the legal
system do not preclude an approach to science which more closely
mirrors the process involved in reaching scientific hypotheses. 0 9
Under the conservative general acceptance standard, courts oper-
ated to admit current scientific theories and techniques but could ex-
clude much of the criticism or revision of that evidence because it had
not yet been generally accepted.210 Thpractice created a cultural lag
in the period between which new research invalidates an earlier ac-
cepted theory and the new theory's general acceptance by the scien-
tific community.21' Therefore, juries may be presented with an
outdated but accepted scientific theory but excluded from considering
the most recent theory or research which counters that earlier evi-
dence.212 Because Daubert applies to both novel and generally ac-
cepted evidence, however, older theories are also subject to review on
207. See id. at 2795.
208. See id. at 2795-96.
209. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993).
210. See generally Weinstein, supra note 150, at 632. Admissibility is an issue of great debate,
particularly in toxic tort cases such as Bendectin and "chemical AIDS," as well as the use of
testimony from experts who interviewed allegedly sexually abused children with the aid of ana-
tomically correct dolls. There are both proponents and opponents of these types of evidence,
but the debate in the law only mirrors that which is now taking place in the respective scientific
realms. While courts should not interfere in these controversies, some introduction of the de-
bate into the trial process will allow the jury to better assess the weight to give the scientific
evidence.
211. 1 GIANELLI & IM WINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-5(F).
212. The Daubert case itself may be an example of this phenomenon. While it has yet to be
determined whether the in vivo, in vitro, animal studies, chemical analysis, or reanalysis evidence
will be admissible upon remand, it is possible that application of the relevancy standard will alter
the admissibility of the evidence. If some or all of the evidence is admissible on remand, the jury
will have a greater ability to weigh the probative value of the epidemiological studies when
allowed to assess also the contradicting evidence. Even if the data from the suspect studies is
itself inadmissible, the court should allow the experts to testify if the studies are of the type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field on the basis of FED. R. EVID. 703. The Rule allows
experts to base their opinion testimony on facts or data which is inadmissible but of the type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Similarly, in Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 506 A.2d 1100, 1104 (D.C. App. 1986), the Court allowed admission of evidence from in
vivo, in vitro studies, chemical analysis, and recalculation that Bendectin can cause birth defects.
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the same basis as new theories.2 13 Therefore, expert testimony must
keep abreast of recent scientific advances. Frye further limited re-
view of scientific debate by the court where there are competing theo-
ries. Because Frye required acceptance of something like "a clear
majority" of the scientific community, where there are competing the-
ories, none of which has the minimum level of acceptance, Frye oper-
ates to exclude all.214 In contrast, Daubert allows the court to bring
this scientific debate into the courtroom and allow the trier of fact to
weigh the competing theories or evidence. This openness will
strengthen the jury's role in fact finding and enhance its ability to as-
sess the probative force of evidence necessary to make a legal
decision.
The Frye test assumes that without assistance of the court, jurors
cannot comprehend conflicting scientific evidence.215 Fears that scien-
tific evidence will assume a "posture of mythic infallibility in the eyes
of a jury of laymen" have mainly been based on anecdotal evi-
dence.216 Empirical research on the jury's ability to understand scien-
tific evidence does not support these fears.217 Instead, it may be
possible that admission of only one scientific theory without allowing
the admission of other conflicting views, results in greater juror preju-
dice in favor of that evidence.21 8 Critical cross-examination as to the
weight of the scientific evidence and presentation of conflicting theo-
ries are appropriate and desirable safeguards to prevent juror over-
reliance on scientific evidence. 219
But in order to prevent the admission of specious or unscientific
evidence under the guise of expert testimony, Daubert will require a
firm hand on the safeguards which already exist in the system. Trial
judges should carefully use mechanisms for directed verdict and sum-
mary judgment where there is insufficient evidence to support a jury
verdict.2 0 Preliminary questions of admissibility should focus closely
on the reliability of the technique or process not on the conclusion it
213. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 n.11.
214. See People v. Guerra, 690 P.2d 635, 656 (Cal. 1984).
215. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F.Supp. 570, 575-76 (S.D. Cal. 1989),
aff'd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993).
216. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
217. See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence:
A Critique From the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 ViLL. L. REv. 544, 566-571 (1983).
218. Id.
219. 1 GIANELL! & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-6(D).
220. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993).
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generates. 22 1 Scientific evidence may be sound although its conclusion
differs from other scientific conclusions or even the judge's own opin-
ion. It is the role of the jury to determine the weight to give conflict-
ing but relevant evidence.
Also, trial judges should rely less on precedent in decisions to
admit or exclude particular evidence. Science does not rely on prior
determinations when formulating new theories in the same way that
legal precedent operates.22 The court should view with skepticism
claims of unopposed scientific "truth." While some well established
techniques should have no difficulty meeting the standards of reliabil-
ity requisite for admissibility, the mere fact that a process has been
admitted in the past as reliable should not be dispositive for future
admissibility. 223
Where a technique or process is so reliable that its admissibility
cannot be fairly questioned, the court should use judicial notice under
Rule 201. 22 Where relevant, judges should also insist on strong guar-
antees that the test relied upon has been properly conducted.225 Testi-
mony based on an improperly administered test is unreliable and
irrelevant despite the validity of the underlying theory or technique. 2 6
Perhaps the most powerful tool to prevent the admissibility of confus-
ing scientific evidence is Rule 403. Judicious use of exclusion for rea-
sons of unfair prejudice, confusion or misleading of the jury, or waste
of time is warranted.22 7
The liberal nature of the decision in Daubert may strengthen sup-
port for a proposed amendment to Rule 703 which would tighten its
loose admissibility standard. The proposed amendment is facially
more restrictive than the existing Rule and would make the use of
expert testimony more difficult.228 Like the current rule under
Daubert, the amendment would require that the court find the evi-
dence to be reliable. 22 9 But in addition to reliability, the information
221. Weinstein, supra note 150, at 641.
222. See Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798.
223. See id. at 2796 n.11.
224. Id. See also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985).
225. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786,2796 n.11 (1993). See also Down-
ing, 753 F.2d at 1232 & 1232 n.10.
226. See United States v. TWo Bulls, 918 F.2d 56,60-61 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated, 925 F.2d 1127
(8th Cir. 1991) (after death of defendant); People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 998-999 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1989).
227. See Daubert, 113 S.Ct. at 2798.
228. Weinstein, supra note 150, at 632-34.
229. Id. at 636.
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must substantially assist the trier of fact.230 The current rule requires
only helpfulness.3 Admission is presumed unless the issues under
Rule 403 substantially overwhelm the probative value. 3 2 The amend-
ment would also require disclosure of the expert's background and
proposed testimony before he can testify. 3 3 If the thrust of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence has, to this point, been liberal admissibility and
a relaxation of the traditional barriers to expert testimony, the pro-
posed amendment is a step back from that permissive backdrop. On
some points, the amendment represents the standard already being
applied by federal judges.3 4 Additionally, after the guidelines estab-
lished in Daubert, there are already adequate safeguards present to
prevent the admission of inappropriate or absurd scientific
evidence.3 5
The Daubert decision may also have more far-reaching impact in
state courts. Some states which have modeled their rules of evidence
after the Federal Rules continue to apply the Frye test for admissibil-
ity of novel scientific evidence.3 6 In light of the decision in Daubert,
an approach more consistent with the federal courts should be in or-
der.37 Those states which continue to apply Frye will be out of step
and use of expert testimony in these jurisdictions will continue to suf-
fer from the problems inherent in the Frye standard.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in Daubert will have far-reaching impact on the use
of expert scientific testimony in federal courts. Not only has it clari-
fied the admissibility standard for this evidence, addressing the split in
the circuits, but it may also have opened the door to a legal view of
scientific theories and techniques which is more representative of the
scientific process. The liberal admissibility of expert testimony, while
not without dangers, will result in more truth-seeking in the court-




233. Id. at 637.
234. Id. at 639.
235. See generally id. at 631-638; United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,1238 n.18 (3d Cir.
1985).
236. See generally 1 GiANELUi & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at 9-10 n.55.
237. But cf. State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 45-46 (Minn. App.) (refusing to follow Daubert on
state law grounds), review granted in part and remanded, 505 S.W.2d 72 (Minn. 1993).
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"general acceptance" requirement preventing the admission of proba-
tive evidence. The standard in Daubert is not only more consistent
with the thrust of the Federal Rules of Evidence but will also permit
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